Modeling and optimizing evolving security situations

Andres Ojamaa Joint work with CCD COE

Institute of Cybernetics at TUT

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Outline

Introduction Background and Motivation

Graded Security Model

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Security Situation Management

- The aim is to provide the best possible security of a system with given amount of resources, taking existing situation into account.
- At the same time at least the standard requirements should be satisfied, if possible.
- Solutions are usually needed yesterday. Therefore detailed risk analysis is not a good option.
- The goal is achieved by coarse-grained analysis of security situation and optimisation of resource usage.



Situation Description: Security Goals

Security class is determined by security levels, associated with security goals:

- confidentiality (C),
- integrity (I),
- availability (A),
- non-repudiation (N).
- **e.g.** C2 I1 A1 N2

The model can be *extended* by adding security goals.



Situation Description: Parameters of the Model

- Available resources r
- Integral measure of security S
- Security measures groups g₁, g₂,..., g_n
- Security levels of measures groups $-l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_n$
- Security confidences granted by measures groups q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_n
- Relative importance of measures groups: weights —

$$a_1, a_2, ..., a_n$$
, where $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i = 1$

Abstract Security Profile

An *abstract security profile p* is an assignment of security levels to each group of security measures:

$$p = (l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_n)$$



Cost Function

The cost function *h* gives the costs h(I, g) required for implementing security measures of a group *g* for a level *I*. The costs of implementing a given abstract security profile:

$$costs(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h(l_i, g_i)$$

Goal 1: Keep the value of costs(p) as low as possible.



Levels Requirement Function

Function *s* produces a required security level s(c, g) for a group *g* when the security class is *c*. The requirements may be prescribed by security standards such as BSI, NISPOM or ISKE.



The overall security of a system is described by means of an integrated security metrics (integral security confidence) *S*.

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i q_i$$

Goal 2: Increase security confidence of a system.



Dependencies





Conventional Graded Security Solution











Graded Security Expert System





Visual Specification





Knowledge Modules as Decision Tables

| smcomplex-gses (table.tbl) - Expert Table | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Example of Results



Example of Results with Constraints





Future Work

- Combine the optimization package with risk analysis tools (e.g. attack trees)?
- Improve the visual language and the user interface
- Collect and accumulate expert knowledge and real data
- Experiments with real data
- Implement dependant measure groups
- Analyze sensitivity of results wrt inaccurate input data



Summary

A CoCoViLa package was developed to help the IT manager/security expert answer the following questions quickly:

- How much resources are needed to achieve the required level of information security?
- What is the best way to spend the IT security budget?

There is a pilot project to test the system in practice.



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References

- CoCoViLa Compiler Compiler for Visual Languages, http://www.cs.ioc.ee/cocovila/
- A. Ojamaa, E. Tyugu, J. Kivimaa. Pareto-optimal situation analysis for selection of security measures. In: MILCOM 08: Assuring Mission Success: Unclassified Proceedings, November 17-19 San Diego, 2008, 7 p.

