

# A depth-first implementation of Geometric Logic in Prolog

(extended overview)

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# GL as a fragment of FOL

- Geometric formula:  $C \Rightarrow D$
- $C = A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n$  ( $n \geq 0$ ,  $A_i$  atoms)
- $D = E_1 \vee \dots \vee E_m$  ( $m \geq 0$ )
- $E_j = (E \ x_1 \dots x_k) C_j$  ( $k \geq 0$ ,  $C_j$  like  $C$ )
- Implicit universal closure
- No function symbols (yet), only constants

# Examples

- Lattices (meet is associative, Horn clause):  
 $x \cap y = u \wedge u \cap z = v \wedge y \cap z = w \Rightarrow x \cap w = u$
- Projective unicity (resolution clause):  
 $p|l \wedge p|m \wedge q|l \wedge q|m \Rightarrow p=q \vee l=m$
- Diamond property (geometric clause):  
 $a \rightarrow b \wedge a \rightarrow c \Rightarrow (\exists d) (b \rightarrow d \wedge c \rightarrow d)$
- In general:  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n \Rightarrow$   
 $((\exists \mathbf{x}) A_{11} \wedge \dots \wedge A_{1i}) \vee \dots \vee ((\exists \mathbf{y}) A_{k1} \wedge \dots \wedge A_{kj})$

# Rationale

- Horn clauses: DCG and Prolog
- Resolution: ATP
- Geometric logic: ATP and ?
  - Less skolemization
  - Direct proofs
  - Constructive logic
  - Natural proof theory/objects

# Inductive definition of $X \vdash_{(T)} D$

• (base)  $X \vdash D$  if  $X \downarrow D$

• (step)  $\frac{X, \underline{C_1} \vdash D, \dots, X, \underline{C_n} \vdash D}{X \vdash D}$   
 (‰)

$X$  a finite set of facts (= closed atoms)

$D$  closed geometric disjunction (parameters in  $D$  must occur in  $X$ )

$X \downarrow D$  iff  $D = \dots \vee (E \mathbf{x}) C \vee \dots$  and  $X$  contains all facts in  $C[\mathbf{x}:=\mathbf{a}]$   
 for suitable parameters  $\mathbf{a}$

(‰) there exists a *closed* instance  $C_0 \Rightarrow D_0$  of an axiom in  $T$  with

$C_0$  *included in*  $X$  ( $X$  contains all facts in  $C_0$ ) and

$D_0 = \dots \vee (E \mathbf{x}) C_i \vee \dots$  and each  $\underline{C_i}$  a *fresh* instance of  $C_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ )

# Examples of derivations

- $T = \{\text{true} \Rightarrow p, p \Rightarrow q\}, \emptyset \vdash q$
- $T = \{p \vee q, p \Rightarrow r, q \Rightarrow r\}, \emptyset \vdash r$
- $T = \{p, p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow \text{false}\}, \emptyset \vdash r$
- $T = \{(E x)p(x), p(x) \Rightarrow q\}, \emptyset \vdash q$
- $T = \{s(a,b), s(x,y) \Rightarrow (E z) s(y,z)\},$   
 $\emptyset \vdash (E x y)(s(a,x) \wedge s(x,y))$
- Forward reasoning (cf. Prolog)!

# Metaproperties

- Soundness
- Completeness
- Constructivity
- Conservativity
- Semidecidability
- Automation (SATCHMO!)

# Samples of ATP

- exist.in
- or.in
- nijm.in



# Case studies

- Confluence theory: induction steps in Newman's Lemma, Hindley-Rosen, Self-lengthening Thm, ..
- Lattice theory:  $x \cap (y \cup z) \leq (x \cap y) \cup (x \cap z)$  for all  $x, y, z$  implies  $(x \cup y) \cap (x \cup z) \leq x \cup (y \cap z)$  for all  $x, y, z$
- Projective geometry: equivalence of two versions of Pappus' Axiom (1 minute, 1MB proof)

# Semantics and completeness

- Geometric logic: no proof by contradiction  
(= EM, TND,  $A \vee \sim A$ ,  $\sim \sim A \Rightarrow A$ )
- Digression: constructivism in mathematics
  - $p \vee q$  stronger than  $\sim(\sim p \wedge \sim q)$
  - $(\exists x) p(x)$  stronger than  $\sim(\forall x) \sim p(x)$
  - more strict on ontology of objects
  - EM only in specific cases, f.e., for integers  
 $(\forall x)(x=0 \vee x \neq 0)$ , but not for reals

# Example of non-constructivism

- Do there exist irrational real numbers  $x$  and  $y$  such that  $x^y$  is rational ?
- Greek constructivists:  $\sqrt{2}$  is irrational
- Non-constructivist: take  $x = y = \sqrt{2}$ . If  $x^y$  is rational, then I'm done. If  $x^y$  is not rational, then I'm also done:  $(x^y)^y = x^{y \cdot y} = x^2 = 2$  is rational. Next problem, please.
- Constructivist: what do you mean?

# Tarskian semantics

- Truth values from a complete Boolean algebra, without loss of generality ( $\{0,1\}$ ,  $\max$ ,  $\min$ ,  $\text{not}(x) = 1-x$ ),  $\llbracket p \vee q \rrbracket = \max(\llbracket p \rrbracket, \llbracket q \rrbracket)$  etc.
- Thus  $p \vee q$  is true iff  $p$  is true or  $q$  is true (Girard: ``what a discovery!'')
- Sound but not complete for constructive logic, not sound for some forms of constructive mathematics
- Constructive logic is more expressive ( $\forall, E$ ) and requires a more refined semantics ...

# Semantics for constructivism (digr.)

- Algebraic: complete Heyting algebras (plural!)
- Topological: open sets as truth values
- Kripke semantics: tree-structured Tarski models (graph-structured for modal logic), creative subject
- Curry-Howard interpretation:  $[\![\varphi]\!]$  is the set of proofs of  $\varphi$
- Kleene, Beth, Joyal, ...
- Different aspects, counter models, metatheory, ...

# Semantics for GL

- Tarskian (non-constructive completeness)
- Beth-Joyal-Coquand (fully constructive, extra information, but highly non-trivial)
- Curry-Howard (for proof objects)
- Other semantics unexplored ...

# Completeness wrt Tarskian models

- Given  $D$  true in all models of  $T$ , how do you find a proof ? Try them all !
- Breadth-first derivability on the blackboard
- Herbrand models along the branches
- König's Lemma to get the tree finite
- Finite tree  $\Rightarrow$  breadth-first proof  $\Rightarrow$  |- proof