

ALGEBRAIC MODELS OF QUESTION ANSWERING SYSTEMS

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1. Background

Some simple models

- Information systems (Z. Pawlak)
(another names: attribute systems, knowledge representation systems)
 Ob is a set of *objects*,
 At is a set of *attributes* of objects,
 $Val := (Val_a \mid a \in At)$ is a family of sets;
each Val_a is the set of *values* for the attribute a ,
 $F := (f_o \mid o \in Ob)$ on At is a family of *descriptions* (functions on At , where f_o assigns to every a an element of Val_a).

(b) Incomplete: if the descriptions may be not complete,
i.e., if each $f_o(a)$ is a nonempty subset of Val_a .

$f_a(o)$ could also be a fuzzy subset of Val_a , or a probability distribution on Val_a , e.c.

Another interpretation: a (simple) *question answering system*:

- Elements of Ob – *states*,
- elements of At – *questions*,
- elements of Val_a – *possible answers* to a question a ,
- descriptions – *information functions*.

- Formal contexts (R.Wille & B.Ganter)

A *formal context* is a triple $FC := (G, M, I)$, where

G is a set of objects (Gegenstände),
 M is a set of possible properties (Merkmale),
 I is a binary incidence relation in $G \times M$.

$g I m$ means “the object g has the property m ”.

FC induces a Galois connection between $\mathcal{P}(G)$ and $\mathcal{P}(M)$:

$$A \subseteq G \mapsto A^* := \{m \in M \mid g I m \text{ for all } g \in A\},$$

$$B \subseteq M \mapsto B^* := \{g \in G \mid g I m \text{ for all } m \in B\}.$$

A pair (A, B) is a *concept* of the context if $A^* = A$ and $B^* = B$.

Concepts are ordered by

$$(A, B) \leq (A', B') := A \subseteq A' \text{ (and } B' \subseteq B)$$

and form a lattice under this ordering (the *concept lattice* of the context).

- Information systems as formal contexts

(Ob, At, Val, F) – an information system.

A *descriptor* is a pair (a, v) with $a \in At$ and $v \in Val_a$.

The *information space of S* is the set K of all descriptors.

The *formal context of S* is the triple (Ob, K, \vdash) , where

$$o \vdash (a, v) :\equiv v \in f_o(a).$$

Information system \leftrightarrow formal context of this type.

- The inner logic of an information system

$IS := (Ob, At, Val, F)$ – an information system.

A pair (a, V) with $a \in At$ and $V \subseteq Val_a$ is interpreted as a proposition
“the value of a belongs to V ”.

$P :=$ the set of all propositions.

The *inner logic of IS* is the triple (in fact, a formal context) (Ob, P, \models) , where
 $o \models (a, V) \equiv f_o(a) \subseteq V$ (“the proposition (a, V) is true of o ”).

Information system \leftrightarrow formal context of this type.

- Many-valued contexts (R.Wille & B.Ganter)

A *many-valued context* is a quadruple (G, M, W, I) , where

G is a set of objects,

M is a set of attributes,

W is a set of values (Werte),

I is a ternary incidence relation in $G \times M \times W$ such that
 $(g, m, w) \in I$ and $(g, m, w') \in I$ implies $w = w'$.

$(g, m, w) \in I$ means "the attribute m has a value w for the object g ".

Many-valued context \leftrightarrow complete information system.

- Chu spaces (W.Pratt)

K – a set of values (or an alphabet).

A *Chu space over K* is a triple (X, r, A) , where

X is a set of points

A is a set of states

r is a function of type $X \times A \rightarrow K$.

States \leftrightarrow objects,

Points \leftrightarrow attributes,

Chu space \leftrightarrow complete information system

with a common value set K for all attributes.

Dependencies and compatibility in information systems

Let $IS := (Ob, At, Val, F)$ be a **complete** information system.

Drawbacks?

- Attributes in IS are formally independent, for descriptions in F may be quite arbitrary.

Let $A, B \subseteq At$ (**complex** attributes).

There is an **inclusion dependency** between A and B iff $A \subseteq B$.

A **functionally depends** on B if, for every object, the value of every attribute in A turns out to be uniquely determined by values of attributes in B :

$$a \leftarrow B \text{ :} \equiv \text{ for all } o_1, o_2 \in Ob, \\ f_{o_1}(a) = f_{o_2}(a) \text{ whenever } f_{o_1}(b) = f_{o_2}(b) \text{ for every } b \in B.$$

$$A \leftarrow B \text{ :} \equiv a \leftarrow B \text{ for all } a \in A.$$

Dependencies *a posteriori*.

A complex attribute A should have a set of complex values:

$$Val_A := \prod (A_a \mid a \in A)$$

i.e., Val_A is the set of all functions φ on A such that $\varphi(a) \in Val_a$ for all $a \in A$.

Descriptions should be extended to complex attributes:

$$f_o^+(A) \in Val_A, \quad f_o^+(A)(a) := f_o(a).$$

Proposition. If $A \leftarrow B$, then there is a function $d_A^B : Val_B \rightarrow Val_A$ which realises this dependency:

$$\text{for every object } o, \quad f_o^+(A) = d_A^B(f_o^+(B)).$$

This function is unique only if the sets Val_a do not contain “unnecessary” elements:

$$\text{for every } a \in At, \quad Val_a = \{f_o(a) \mid o \in Ob\}.$$

In particular, if $A \subseteq B$, then

- $d_A^B(\varphi) = \varphi|_A$,
- the function d_A^B is surjective and is actually the projection of the set Val_B onto A .

- It may happen that not all attributes permit simultaneous determination of their values.

Suppose that given is a symmetric and irreflexive *rejection* relation on At .

A complex attribute $A \subseteq At$ is said to be *coherent* if no attributes from A reject each other.

Two coherent complex attributes A and B are said to be *compatible* if A and B have a common coherent superset. This is the case if and only if the union $A \cup B$ is coherent.

Proposition. The union of any set of parts of a coherent complex attribute is coherent,
i.e., the coherent complex attributes form a bounded complete poset under set inclusion.

- Summing up: an extension of an information system.

$IS := (Ob, At, Val, F)$ – a complete information system.

Put

- At^+ – a set of coherent complex attributes together with inclusion and dependence relations,
- Val^+ – the family of all complex value sets Val_A together with the family of all dependency functions d_A^B ,
- F^+ – the set of all extended descriptions f_o^+ .

Then $IS^+ := (Ob, At^+, Val^+, F^+)$ is an information system, called an *extension of S* .

Problem 0. Characterise abstractly the class of structures isomorphic to such extensions.

This was the motivation for constructions in the next section.

“Question-answer” interpretation again:

Notion:

states instead of objects
questions instead of coherent complex attributes
answers instead of complex values
information functions instead of descriptions

Notation:

S instead of Ob ,
 Q instead of At^+ ,
 A instead of Val^+ ,
 F

2. Functional-dependency frames

Definition. An *fd-structure* is a pair $FD := (Q, A)$, where

- Q is a preordered set (Q, \leftarrow) (the *scheme* of the frame),
- A is a system (a *model* of the scheme) consisting of
 - a family of sets $(A_q \mid q \in Q)$, and
 - a family of mappings $d_p^q: A_q \rightarrow A_p$ with $p, q \in Q, p \leftarrow q$ such that

$$d_p^p(a) = a, \quad d_p^q d_q^r(c) = d_p^r(c).$$

A subset Q' of Q is *compatible* if it is bounded from above:

i.e., if there is $r \in Q$ such that $p \leftarrow r$ for every $p \in Q'$.

The set Q is [*finitely*] *bounded complete* if every [finite] (possibly, empty) compatible subset of Q has a l.u.b.

Roughly, a l.u.b. of a compatible subset $Q' \subseteq Q$ represents the “complex question” Q' as a one element of Q .

Equivalently, Q is bounded complete iff every nonempty subset of Q (in particular, Q itself) has a g.l.b.

Q is finitely bounded complete iff

- $p \circ q$ always implies that $\{p, q\}$ has a l.u.b., and
- Q has a g.l.b.

We shall assume that all finitely bounded complete preordered sets considered below satisfy also condition

- any finite nonempty subset of Q has a g.l.b.

Definition. An fd-structure (Q, A) is said to be an *fd-frame* if

- its scheme Q is finitely bounded complete, and
- the model A of the scheme satisfies the condition
if r is a l.u.b of a finite subset Q' of Q , and
if $a, b \in A_r$,
then $d_p^r(a) = d_p^r(b)$ for all $p \in Q$ implies $a = b$.

The later condition guaranties that an answer to the question r is completely detemined by the answers to its “components” from Q' .

Dependencies *apriori*

Definition. We say that an fd-frame is a *frame with inclusions* if its scheme Q is equipped with an order relation \subseteq (*inclusion*, or *part_of* relation) whose interaction with \leftarrow is subject to the following axioms:

- if $p \subseteq q$, then $p \leftarrow q$,
- if Q' is a finite compatible subset of Q in which
 $p \leftarrow q$ only if $p \subseteq q$,
then Q' has the l.u.b. with respect to \subseteq ,
- every mapping d_p^q is surjective whenever $p \subseteq q$.

In particular, such a poset (Q, \subseteq) is a finitely bounded complete also with respect to \subseteq :

- if $p \circ q$, then $p \cup q$ exists in Q' ,
- any two elements p, q of Q' have the meet $p \cap q$ in Q' ,
- there is the \subseteq -least element \emptyset in Q .

Proposition. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependencies

- if $p \subseteq q$, then $p \leftarrow q$,
- if $p \leftarrow r, q \leftarrow r, p \perp\!\!\!\perp q$, then $p \cup q \leftarrow r$,
- if $p \leftarrow q, q \leftarrow r$, then $p \leftarrow r$

hold in $(Q, \leftarrow, \subseteq)$.

Examples

E1: Simple frames

Suppose that

Q is a flat domain

(i.e., a poset $(Q, \leq, 0)$ with the least element 0 , in which every chain is of length ≤ 2),

A is a family $(A_p \mid p \in Q)$ of non-empty sets

A_0 is a singleton.,

Put

$$p \leftarrow q \equiv p \subseteq q \equiv p \leq q,$$

$$d_p^q := \begin{cases} \text{the identity function on } A_q \text{ if } p = q, \\ \text{the single function } A_q \rightarrow A_0 \text{ if } p = 0. \end{cases}$$

In this way, Q is converted into a trivial scheme with inclusions, and A , in its model.

So, (Q, A) is an inclusion frame.

We call such frames *simple*.

E2: Frames from information systems

Suppose that $IS := ((Ob, At, Val, F))$ is an information system.

(At, Val) is a simple frame “without bottom”;

there is a one-to-one correspondence between pairs of kind (At, Val) and simple frames.

In any extension of IS , the pair (At^+, Val^+) is a frame with inclusions.

E3: Frames in relational databases

Initially At, Val – as in an information system.

At^+	is the set of finite subsets of At , (<i>relational types</i>)
Val_A a subset of Val_A	is the set of all <i>rows</i> of type A , is a <i>relation</i> with attributes in A ,
\subseteq	is the ordinary set inclusion,
\leftarrow together	is given as a kind of constraints, (<i>sintactically and semantically</i>),
with functions d_A^B [d_A^B with $A \subseteq B$	is a the projection of Val_B onto A].

E4: Frames from automata

Consider an automaton (X, Y, Z, λ, μ) , where

X is the input alphabet,
 Y is the output alphabet,
 Z is the set of states,
 $\lambda: Z \times X \rightarrow Z$ is the transition function,
 $\mu: Z \times X \rightarrow Y$ is the output function.

Set

$Q := X^*$,
 $p \subseteq q := p$ is a prefix of q ,
 $p \leftarrow q := p \subseteq q$,
 $A_p := Y^{|p|}$, where $|p|$ is the length of p ,
 $d_p^q: A_q \rightarrow A_p :=$ the function which takes every word from A_q
into its prefix of length $|p|$.

Then (Q, A) is an inclusion frame and two questions are compatible if and only if they are comparable.

Let $FD := (Q, V)$ be a frame.

Definition. An *information piece* in this frame is any pair (q, a) with $q \in Q, a \in A_q$.

The set of all information pieces is called the *knowledge space* of FD .

An information piece (p, a) is said to be

- *entailed by* (q, b) (in symbols, $(p, a) \succeq (q, b)$) if

$$p \leftarrow q \text{ and } a = d_p^q(b),$$

[“Whenever q has the answer b , p has the answer a ”]

- a *restriction of* (q, b) (in symbols, $(p, a) \subseteq (q, b)$) if

$$p \subseteq q \text{ and } a = d_p^q(b).$$

An *abstract knowledge space* is a triple (K, \succeq, \subseteq) that is isomorphic to the knowledge space of some frame with inclusions.

Theorem 1. Up to isomorphisms, there is one-to-one correspondence between frames with inclusions and abstract knowledge spaces.

[Axiomatic description of abstract knowledge spaces.]

3. Question answering systems

$FD := (Q, A)$ – an fd-structure with inclusions.

Definition. An *information function* in FD is a function f on Q that assigns a nonempty subset of A_p to every $p \in Q$ so that

- if $p \leftarrow q$, then $f(p) = \{d_p^q(b) : b \in f(q)\} = d_p^q(f(q))$
(i.e., if p depends on q , then $f(p)$ contains just the answers that can be calculated out from those in $f(q)$),
- if r is a l.u.b of a finite subset $Q' \subseteq Q$ with respect to \leftarrow , then
 $f(r) := \{c \in A_r \mid d_p^r(c) \in f(p) \text{ for all } p \in Q'\}$
(i.e., $f(r)$ contains just the answers that are combined from those belonging to the “components” of r).

An information function f is

- *complete* if every $f(p)$ is a singleton,
- *proper* if there is no other description f' with $f'(p) \subseteq f(p)$ for all $p \in Q$,
- *trivial*, if $f(p) = A_p$.

Every complete description is proper; the converse may not hold true.

Example: A frame which has only the trivial information function.

Let

$Q := \{p1, p2, q1, q2\}$, and

for $i = 1, 2$, $A_{pi} := \{a_{i1}, a_{i2}\}$, $A_{qi} := \{b_{i1}, b_{i2}\}$.

Assume that

$p1, p2 \subseteq q1, q2$, and \leftarrow coincides with \subseteq .

Set

$$d_{pi}^{q1}(b_{1j}) = a_{ij}, \quad d_{p1}^{q2}(b_{2j}) = a_{1j},$$

$$d_{p2}^{q2}(b_{21}) = a_{22}, \quad d_{p2}^{q2}(b_{22}) = a_{21}.$$

The trivial information function is proper in this frame, but, clearly, not complete.

Definition. A *question answering system* is a quadruple (Q, A, S, F) , where

(Q, A) is an fd-frame with inclusions,
 S is a non-empty set,
 $F := (f_s \mid s \in S)$ is a family of information functions.

Elements of
of Q are called *questions*, those of A_q , *answers to the question q* .

A QA-system is
complete if all of its information functions are complete,
simple if its frame is simple.

Simple QA-system \leftrightarrow information system.

Definition. The *formal context of a QA-system* $QA := (Q, A, S, F)$ is the triple (S, K, \vdash) , where

- K is the knowledge space of QA , and
- \vdash is a binary relation in $S \times K$ such that
$$s \vdash (p, a) \equiv a \in f_s(p).$$

A *QA-context* is a formal context of some QA-system.

A formal context (S, K, \vdash) , where K is an abstract knowledge space, is said to be an *abstract QA-context* if it is isomorphic to some QA-context.

Something like Kripke structures, with S the possible word space,
and K the algebra of propositions.

Theorem 2. Up to isomorphisms, there is one-to-one correspondence between QA-systems and abstract QA-contexts.

Problem 1. Characterise the class of abstract QA-contexts.

The concept lattice of the formal context of a QA-system is said to be the *concept lattice of this system*.

Problem 2. Characterise the class of concept lattices of QA-systems. Have concept lattices of complete QA-systems any distinctive property?

Problem 3. Two QA-systems may be considered as equivalent if their concept lattices are isomorphic. *Characterise the class of QA-systems which are equivalent to a complete QA-system.*

4. Simulation

In this section we assume that all QA-systems are *faithful* in the sense that, for every q , $A_q = \bigcup (f_s(q) \mid s \in S)$.

Let $QA := (Q, A, S, F)$ $QA' := (Q', A', S', F')$ be two QA-systems. By a *macrostate* of a system we understand any non-empty set of its states.

(Macrostates are interpreted as vaguely specified states.)

A simulation of a QA into QA' is, *informally*, a triple of “devices” (α, β, γ) , where

- α translates every question from Q into a question in Q' ,
- β realizes back translation: for every question $q \in Q$, it associates a non-empty subset of A_q with each possible answer $a' \in A'_{\alpha(q)}$ to the translated question $\alpha(q)$,
- γ interprets every state of QA as a macrostate of QA' : if a question was put to QA in some state, translated back are all answers to the translated question in QA' obtained in any state from the respective macrostate.

Definition. A *simulation* of a QA into QA' is a triple (α, β, γ) , where

- α is a mapping $Q \rightarrow Q'$,
- β is a family of mappings $\beta_q: A'_{\alpha(q)} \rightarrow (\mathcal{P}(A_q) \setminus \emptyset)$ with $q \in Q$,
- γ is a mapping $S \rightarrow (\mathcal{P}(S') \setminus \emptyset)$

subject to the following conditions:

- β preserves l.u.b.-s of finite compatible subsets of Q ,
(then α is isotone with respect to both \leftarrow and \subseteq),
- for all $p, q \in Q$ with $p \leftarrow q$, and every $a' \in A_{\alpha(q)}$,

$$\bigcup (f_p^q(a) \mid a \in \beta_q(a')) = \bigcup (\beta_p(b') \mid b' \in f'_{\alpha(p)}{}^{\alpha(q)}(a')),$$

- for all $p \in Q$, and every $s \in S$,

$$f_s(p) = \bigcup (\beta_p(a') \mid a' \in f'_{s'}(\alpha(p)) \text{ for some } s' \in \gamma(s)).$$

Let $QA := (Q, A, S, F)$ be a **simple complete** QA-system. Extensions of QA are constructed like those of an information system.

Let QA^+ stand for the **standard** extension (Q^+, At^+, S, F^+) in which At^+ contains **all** subsets of Q . Such an extension is unique and completely determined by QA . Recall that extensions of complete QA-systems are complete.

Definition. A QA-system is said to be

- **essentially incomplete** if it can be simulated by no complete QA-system,
- **representable** if it can be simulated by a simple complete QA-system.

Proposition. Not every QA-system is representable.

Problem 4. Are there essentially incomplete QA-systems? If yes, characterise abstractly those that are not.

Problem 5. Characterise abstractly the representable QA-systems.

5. The previous work

[1] and [2] are early papers, where several ideas of the later ones already appeared.

Among other things, in [3] discussed are certain formal contexts (without referring to this concept) similar to those appearing here in connection with knowledge spaces.

In [4-6] I used another term "knowledge representation system" rather than "question answering system" going back to [2]. In [4], KR-systems without inclusions were treated in terms of category theory. The approach of [5,6] is not so general, and we use there the language of general algebra (as in this presentation). However, some improvements to the model of [4] can be found at the beginning of [6]. Neither in [5] nor [6] inclusion dependencies are explicitly recognized.

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